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Abstract—Tor is a communications infrastructure widely used
for unfettered and anonymous access to Internet websites. Tor is
also used to access sites on the .onion virtual domain. The focus of
.onion use and discussion has traditionally been on the offering of
hidden services, services that separate their reachability from the
identification of their IP addresses. We argue that Tor’s .onion
system can be used to provide an entirely separate benefit: basic
website authentication. We also argue that not only can onionsites
provide website authentication, but doing so is easy, fast, cheap,
flexible and secure when compared to alternatives such as the
standard use of TLS with certificates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tor is a widely popular communications infrastructure
for anonymous communication. Millions use its thousands of
relays for unfettered traffic-secure access to the Internet. The
vast majority of Tor traffic by bandwidth (over 99% at our last
check) is on circuits connecting Tor clients to servers that are
otherwise accessible. Tor also provides protocols for connect-
ing to services on the pseudo-top-level domain .onion, which
are only accessible via Tor. In this paper we explore using Tor’s
.onion infrastructure so that individuals operating a website
can create authentication, integrity and other guarantees more
simply, easily, fully, cheaply, and flexibly than by relying only
on standard protocols and authorities.
Tor’s onionsites have been advocated since their introduc-
tion as a way to protect network location information for
servers not just clients [1]. 1 Discussion in the popular press,
as well as research to date, has focused almost exclusively on
location hiding and associated properties provided by onion-
sites and the protocols to interact with them. Indeed, these
are generally referred to collectively as Tor Hidden Services
in the research literature and as the Dark Web in the popular
press. (Although so many importantly distinct things are often
subsumed and run together under ‘Dark Web’ as to rob the
term of clear significance, other than as a caution flag for the
hidden incoherence that surrounds most occasions of its use.)
Our intent is to challenge the narrowness of this view of
onionsites. In particular we will discuss security protections
they readily facilitate that are largely orthogonal to hiding
server location. We hope by the end of this paper the reader
will agree that they should be called onion services or in any
case something that is more properly inclusive of the variety
of security properties they offer.
1Such advocacy actually predates their introduction inasmuch as the same
was said for web servers contacted by reply onions [2], See also [3] for
description of an implemented predecessor to Tor’s hidden services.
II. BRIEF BACKGROUND ON TOR AND ONION SERVICES
We sketch out minimal basics of Tor onion services.
For more detailed descriptions see the Tor design paper or
other documentation at the Tor website [4]. For a high-level
graphical description of onion services see [5]. For a more up
to date, and much more technical, description of onion services
protocols see the Tor Rendezvous Specification [6].
Tor clients randomly select three of the roughly 6000 relays
comprising the current Tor network, and create a cryptographic
circuit through these to connect to Internet services. Since only
the first relay in the circuit sees the IP address of the client and
only the last (exit) relay sees the IP address of the destination,
this technique separates identification from routing. To offer
an onion service, a web (or other) server creates Tor circuits
to multiple Introduction Points that await connection attempts
from clients. A user wishing to connect to a particular onion
service uses the onion address to look up these Introduction
Points in a directory system. In a successful interaction, the
client and onionsite then both create Tor circuits to a client-
selected Rendezvous Point. The Rendezvous Point mates their
circuits together, and they can then interact as ordinary client
and server of a web connection over this rendezvous circuit.
Since the onionsite only communicates over Tor circuits it
creates, this protocol hides its network location, the feature that
gives it the name ‘hidden service’. But, there are other impor-
tant features to the .onion system, notably self-authentication.
The onion address is actually the hash of the public key of
the onionsite. For example, if one wishes to connect to the
DuckDuckGo search engine’s onion service, the address is
3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion. The Tor client recognizes this as an
onion address and thus knows to use the above protocol rather
than attempting to pass the address through a Tor circuit for
DNS resolution at the exit. The public key corresponds to the
key that signs the list of Introduction Points and other service
descriptor information provided by the directory system. In
this way, onion addresses are self-authenticating.
III. KNOWING TO WHICH SELF TO BE TRUE
Of course this authentication only binds the service de-
scriptor information to the 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion address.
What a user would like to be assured of is that s/he is
reaching DuckDuckGo. Presumably the user wants the search
results DuckDucGo offers and not what might be returned
by some other, possibly malicious, server. In addition to the
integrity guarantee, the user relies on authentication so that
queries are revealed only to DuckDuckGo and not to others.
The onion address by itself does not offer this. Making use
of the traditional web trust infrastructure, DuckDuckGo and
Facebook offer certificates for their onion addresses issued
by DigiCert. This helps ensure that users are not misled by
onionsites purporting to be official.
Though cryptographic binding is essential to the technical
mechanisms of trust, users also rely on human-readable famil-
iarity, for example, that the browser graphically indicates s/he
has made a certified encrypted connection as a result of typing
facebook.com into the browser. To some extent, it is at least
possible to make use of this in .onion space. By generating
many keys whose hash had ‘facebook’ as initial string and
then looking among the full hashes for an adequately felicitous
result, Facebook was able to obtain facebookcorewwwi.onion
for its address. Whatever its value for Facebook, this is clearly
not something that will work widely, as it is difficult to
generate custom addresses in this way.
Why not just obtain certificates from traditional authorities
as DuckDuckGo and Facebook have done? For many server
operators, getting even a basic server certificate is just too
much of a hassle. The application process can be confusing.
It usually costs money. It’s tricky to install correctly. It’s a
pain to update. These are not original observations. Indeed that
description is actually a quote from the blog of Let’s Encrypt,
a new certificate authority dedicated, among other things, to
making TLS certification free and automatic [7].
Using the existing X.509 system, setting up a certificate can
take hours or even days. In cases where the website is operated
by a collective or organization, SSL/TLS certificates have been
known to take months, due to questions around ownership and
authorization. This time cost is in addition to the monetary cost
of the certificate, if any. In contrast, setting up an onionsite
takes a few minutes and costs nothing. Once Tor is installed,
you simply add two lines to your torrc file and start Tor. The
Tor Project also provides a brief page with additional tips
and advanced options [8]. Even when the process of learning
how to create a PGP key and signature is taken into account,
the time investment is dramatically less than with the current
X.509 public-key infrastructure.
As of this writing, Let’s Encrypt services are still a few
months away. Should they be willing to offer certificates for
onion domains, using Let’s Encrypt could be an easy way
for onionsite operators to take advantage of the traditional
certification infrastructure. Traditional certificates are not with-
out problems, however. The nature of the trust hierarchy
is opaque to direct usage, and the sheer number of trusted
authorities is large enough to be of concern. In particular,
there have been numerous cases of man-in-the-middle (MitM)
attacks through certificate manipulation, as well as hacking of
certificate authorities or certificate validation software leading
to use of fraudulent certificates for some of the most popular
websites [9].
EFF’s SSL Observatory [10] monitors for such problems
and documents their occurrence. Google’s Certificate Trans-
parency Effort [11] is similar but broader, adding (amongst
other things) append-only signed public logs that make certifi-
cate shenanigans all the harder to bring off undetectably.
Rather than simply monitor and flag certificate authority
problems, the Perspectives Project [12] strives to provide end
users with control over the trust they place in website certifi-
cates. Instead of trusting anointed CAs, semi-trusted network
notaries probe network services and build a record of public
keys those services have used over time, somewhat similar
to the approach of certificate transparency. Users can choose
which notaries they wish to trust, and clients encountering
unfamiliar public keys will query notaries for a history of keys
used by a service [13]. This is especially intended to enhance
trust on first use (tofu) authentication, although it can also
supplement traditional CA based PKI security.
IV. OUR ONIONS OURSELVES
As noted, onionsites already provide a self-authenticated
binding of public key to onion address but do not bind
that public key to something recognizably associated with
that site. Even for hidden service applications, it might still
be desired to connect the onionsite to some pseudonymous
reputation. We will view location hiding as largely orthogonal.
We seek a solution that will work for all kinds of sites, but
we are especially interested in providing authentication for
small and/or short-lived websites, e.g., personal web pages,
hometown sports teams, sites for local one-time events, small
businesses, municipal election campaigns, etc. Though not
such large targets as more popular long-lived sites, they are
still subject to controversy and have been subject to many of
the same sorts of attacks as more well-known sites. They might
also not be the target of attacks but simply collateral victims.
Some users of this kind may not even have Internet
accounts that allow them to set up servers. Onionsites are
compliant with such a limitation since they actually only
make outbound client connections. As a related example of
an existing usage, many people administering systems behind
restrictive firewalls that only permit outbound connections
currently use onion services to administer their systems. Even
if the user has an Internet account that permits setting up a
web page, HTTPS may not be available from that provider or
only available for an additional fee.
We are primarily focused on improvements to authenti-
cation using onionsites and thus mostly leave properties of
network location hiding aside as orthogonal to our goals. They
can be complementary, however. Authenticated hidden services
are an appealing option for those who’d like to secure their
onionsites for personal use. Unlike traditional websites that
appear online prior to authentication, users lacking authenti-
cation information for such a site will not be easily able to
determine that it even exists, nor will they be able to probe it
for vulnerabilities. These qualities make an ideal environment
for operating a personal cloud service. With privacy and cost in
mind, many people are operating their own cloud infrastructure
to store files and calendar entries using open-source systems
such as Cozy and OwnCloud [14]. Another common use of
authenticated hidden services is as a personal RSS reader,
as onionsites ensure some level of feed integrity (particularly
important when fetching news feeds that do not utilize TLS).
Of course one can always create a Facebook page or some-
thing similar that is protected by HTTPS and TLS certificates,
and this is often done. But this makes the service dependent on
the reputation, trust, policies, and protections of such a host,
not to mention the dynamics thereof, rather than allowing the
user to readily understand and control these aspects of his
own service. Also, Facebook policy requires identification of
the person providing the site, while we would prefer to leave
this as simply a separate issue.
A very simple way to add binding of the onionsite public
key to a known entity using widely available mechanisms is
to provide a signature on the onion address. We envision a
PGP/GPG signature, but it could be an X.509 signature (or
other as we discuss below). The signed text can simply be
included on the onionsite, making it self-authenticating in this
sense as well. The trust in the authentication will then be
whatever trust is associated with the public key that does the
signing. Such techniques are already used for signing code.
For example, the Tor Project offers signatures on all source
and binaries it makes available for download.
If the signer wishes to post the signed onion address to
a public site such as her Facebook page, she can do this
also. (An advantage of doing so will be discussed below.)
Indeed, a useful public site for doing this would be an
unauthenticated version of the same exact service as the one
being offered at the onionsite. The unauthenticated version and
the onionsite version should both contain a signed pointer
to both versions. It is then easy for anyone who desires
to check their association. For example, we have made an
authenticated version of http://cupcakebridge.com available at
http://eynfqhbaq5yecx6s.onion.
Why even bother with the non-onionsite version? There are
several reasons. First, this allows for a binding of the public
domain name to the onionsite. As mentioned, onion addresses
are inherently not humanly meaningful, which can lead to
confusion among end-users. To get the entirety of a specific
domain name of choice is also technologically infeasible, as
onion addresses are randomly-generated alphanumeric strings
of 16 digits. The signed-onion technique allows someone to
choose and retain a desired domain name for the site, while
still being able to offer an authenticated and integrity protected
version easily. This also illustrates one of the benefits of using
GPG or similar signatures. If the authentication simply showed
that the same party that provided the not-secured site provided
the onionsite, an attacker could set up an altered version,
employ usual techniques to hijack the not-secure site, and offer
a self-authenticated onionsite that matched the hijacked site. To
do this undetectably against the GPG-signed onionsite would
require subversion of the trust in the GPG key. A concern with
using GPG signatures is that users may not be familiar with
them, have appropriate trust in the key, or bother to check the
signature and the trust in the key. We will address these below.
In addition, many intended users of the site may not have
Tor installed. Though installation is a simple point-and-click
download, many may be disinclined against even this small
effort. The onionsite would still be available via Tor2web,
a website that proxies connections from non-Tor clients to
onionsites [15]. To connect to an onionsite, one enters a
URL such as the following for reaching DuckDuckGo’s onion-
site via Tor2web: https://3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.tor2web.org/. The
Tor2web site explicitly states that “Tor2web only protects
publishers, not readers.” This is because the client con-
nects to Tor2web over a direct TLS connection rather than
via Tor, as would be the case of someone connecting to
3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion via the Tor Browser. For our pur-
poses, authentication of the onionsite in this case is limited to
the trust in authentication of this TLS connection (and trust in
Tor2web itself) regardless of the trust in the GPG signature.
Thus, no significant usability limitation arises from using other
browsers, but security is significantly downgraded for the
reasons already mentioned and by various MitM possibilities
raised below.
Finally, traditional search and indexing engines such as
Google do not generally reflect links to onionsites. The search
engine, ahmia.fi [16], is limited to onionsites and known
primarily to those familiar with them. Ahmia creator Juha
Nurmi has, however, agreed to incorporate linking of onion
and clearnet addresses into Ahmia, together with the GPG
signatures binding that linking. He has also suggested to us
that Ahmia could automatically test the signatures and check
the clearnet and onion sites. Thus, a user who trusts Ahmia
(and her connection to Ahmia) on this can verify that a pair
of websites is operated by the same party, even if personally
inexpert with manual PGP verification. Crawling and indexing
of onionsites is also in its infancy and can thus not be expected
to be as appropriately representative as the much more mature
indexing of the surface web by Google and similar sites.
V. USABILITY, CONVENIENCE, AND SECURITY
As most onionsite visitors use the Tor Browser, deployment
and debugging of hidden services can be faster than their
clearnet counterparts because there is only one browser to
test, with only minor variation across users. Website operators
can assume that users do not have AdBlock or other browser
extensions that may impact how content is displayed. However,
plugins that may mitigate Tor Browser’s privacy protections,
such as Java and Flash, have been disabled by default. Many
privacy-conscious users do enable the NoScript extension to
block javascript as well. Despite this, rich content such as
video, audio, and interactive storytelling are still available for
designers willing to use HTML5 and CSS3.
What we have described so far implies a relatively manual
authentication of PGP/GPG signatures. It would be natural and
straightforward to create a plugin that verifies the signature
and provides different indications to the user depending on the
trust in it. There are already related tools, e.g., Monkeysphere,
a Firefox plugin that uses the PGP trust infrastructure for
validation only when the browser does not default accept the
TLS certificate validation [17]. A simpler plugin could also
just check the planned Ahmia validation mentioned above.
Our approach naturally complements Perspectives and sim-
ilar endeavors. Perspectives offers an improvement against
certificate based MitM attacks. But if a site is newly available,
the onionsite can still be trusted to be bound to the owner of
the PGP signature. A new self-signed certificate, on the other
hand, will have little or no Perspectives history, and users are
reduced to a tofu decision. Also, Perspectives notaries largely
function as detectors of certificate misbehavior over time. This
is useful but cannot detect static misuse of certificates. For
example, consider a typo-squatting site that uses a self-signed
certificate to pass through connections to the site on which it is
squatting, but does not misbehave or alter its key. Perspectives
will not reflect anything wrong with such a site, whereas our
approach will presumably not give the site a high degree of
trust unless the squatter has that trust exogenously.
Our approach also can be used (at least in manual form)
right now by website operators. It would benefit from usability
developments and simplification, and it can complement other
approaches. It does not, however, rely fundamentally on the de-
ployment and continued commitment to new infrastructure that
is specific to it. It can instead rely on whatever authentication
infrastructure might be popular and likely to be maintained for
independent reasons, rather than needing to grow and maintain
interest in its approach.
Convergence takes a similar view and is automated and
deployed (but currently is designed for existing TLS sig-
natures). Extending Perspectives, Convergence notaries can
use additional strategies beyond network perspective to create
trust [18]. For example, in addition to perspective notaries, one
can choose to place some trust in tradional CAs, or DNSSEC
authorities, or anyone you like. Also, instead of trusting an
authority or class of authorities essentially forever as is the case
for existing approaches, Convergence more straightforwardly
allows one to add or remove notaries. Convergence is available
in Firefox plugins. It would be interesting to investigate a
Convergence-like addition to the Tor Browser that works with
onion addresses and PGP/GPG signatures.
In the PGP web of trust, signature authority is built up in
a decentralized manner from direct personal connections and
introductions. This more naturally fits with many of the kinds
of websites that we have suggested could most benefit from
our approach, for which local or personal trust relationships
are important [19]. The X.509 trust model currently in general
use to support TLS certificates is by contrast primarily a
hierrarchical centralized chain of trust delegated down from
some ultimate national or global corporate trust anchor.
PGP and its successors also remain less familiar than TLS.
Although popular familiarity is not so much with TLS as
with interfaces that tell the user little more than whether
or not TLS is in operation at all, which is essentially as it
should be for usable security. As noted, similar interfaces
for PGP have been designed but have not yet received the
extensive development of TLS interfaces, unsurprising given
the fundamental role of TLS in global ecommerce. For those
who do not rely on the social or local protections of PGP’s
web of trust, TLS certificates are likely to remain the primary
ground of linking public, human-readable domain names to
the signatures authenticating websites. Assuming Let’s Encrypt
is successful, and no-additional-cost HTTPS is increasingly
available from ISPs, we can also envisage incorporation of TLS
with onionsites for even the “everyman” users described above.
To the extent that this incorporation follows what Facebook
and DuckDuckGo have done, the strength of trust in the
authentication is limited by the trust in the TLS certificate.
Certificate transparency and the like will help here, but the
self-authentication of onion addresses can also add to this trust,
and again in a way more directly under website owner control.
Alternatively something like Convergence could integrate
the advantages from onionsite self-authentication that our
approach provides with the TLS signatures familiar to existing
web browsers. But it would not need to rely on existing CAs,
which is indeed a primary goal of Convergence. This seems a
promising direction, although not as immediately usable as
the manual check we describe. It requires both a web of
trust for TLS signature keys and integration with onionsites
to adequately develop.
Also, unlike conventional web URLs, onion addresses are
inextricably connected to the site authentication key. This
means that if one has publicized the onion address, e.g.,
through blogs, twitter, or Facebook, people following those
address links will not be vulnerable to hijack or MitM by
the subverted CA the way they would be by a link to a
regular URL. This significantly raises the bar on the hijacker
fairly automatically and easily. Further, non-CA-based MitM
techniques such as forcing the site to fall back to a non-
SSL version (e.g., SSLStrip) or to use a weaker cipher to
communicate (e.g, BEAST and FREAK) are also not possible
as the address and key are inextricably linked and generated
using a strong cipher. And, if onionsite private keys were
to sign not just the Introduction Points and other elements
currently stored in the .onion directory system, but also the
TLS certificate, onion keys would bind the TLS certificate to
the site as well as vice versa.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have described how Tor’s onion services
can be used not for the usual stated purpose of hiding server
network location, but for website authentication. We have
also argued that onion services offer users, a simple, effec-
tive, cheap and flexible means of authentication with security
advantages not provided by existing approaches. We hope
people will find this useful and begin employing it. We also
hope our expanded view of the possibilities created by Tor’s
onion services will encourage others to explore this fascinating
system for other interesting properties and applications.
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